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NEITHER POPULISM NOR THE RULE OF
LAW: THE FUTURE OF MARKET
REFORM IN MEXICO
Pamela K. Starr, PhD*
I.

INTRODUCTION

EARLY a generation has passed since Latin America began its
economic journey towards freer markets and increased reliance
on global trade as drivers of growth and development. Early in
this process, the zeal for free trade agreements with the United States was
palpable in most of the region. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, Latin American countries became the loudest proponents of establishing a hemispheric-wide free trade area. Today the situation is markedly different.
Support for free trade has faded throughout the region, albeit to different
degrees in different countries. Doubts about free trade and the economic
wisdom of the so-called "Washington Consensus" of market reforms now
form an important obstacle to building a "Free Trade Area of the Americas." The distinct experience of each Latin American country within this
broad regional trend has also created a mosaic of policy positions relative
to free trade, complicating further any region-wide negotiation to build a
free trade agreement.
Within this broad-brush overview of the trajectory of Latin America's
affinity for freer trade and market reforms, the Mexican experience is
unique. No other Latin American country approaches Mexico in the
depth and breadth of its economic interdependence with the United
States. Mexico relies on the U.S. market to absorb 85 percent of its exports and to supply over 50 percent of it imports and two-thirds of all
foreign direct investment.1 Mexico is the United States' third largest
global trading partner, accounting for 11 percent of total U.S. trade, over
60 percent of U.S. trade with Latin America, and about 40 percent of
U.S. direct investment in the region.2 By signing the North American
Lecturer, International Relations and Public Diplomacy, Senior Fellow,
Center on Public Diplomacy University of Southern California; 3518 Trousdale
Parkway Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043; tel: 213-740-412; fax: 213-742-0281; email:
pkstarr@usc.edu.
1. For trade and investment statistics, see U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/www/; United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Investment in
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007, http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/1/
32931/lcg2360i-f.pdf.
2. Id.
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Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a capstone to a far-reaching market
reform, Mexico was able to guarantee market access for the vast majority
of its exports, legally lock-in its reforms, promote foreign investment, and
thereby make a huge down payment on the long-term viability of an economic development strategy built on deeper integration with the global
economy, and specifically with the world's single largest economy. No
other major Latin American economy is in a similar position. This reality
logically weakened Mexican interest in advancing a region-wide trade
agenda; Mexico has very little to gain economically. It also created an
economic reality that has convinced all but a small minority that Mexico's
future lies with a stable market economy open to international trade.
This economic reality does not necessarily mean that reliance on global
trade will form the foundation of a successful development strategy for
Mexico. Mexican firms must now face aggressive global competitors, yet
their ability to increase their productivity and competitiveness is hindered
by the high cost of services and lagging investment in infrastructure and
human capital development in the Mexican economy. Yet this economic
reality does mean that finding a solution to these problems is more political than it is ideological. Within Mexico there is broad agreement on the
need to ensure long-term macroeconomic stability, to reinvigorate growth
and competitiveness, to deepen global economic integration, and to distribute the gains from trade and growth much more equitably. There is
also general agreement that a series of reforms are essential to achieving
these goals, chief among them energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, education, and labor reform. There are strong differences of policy
opinion about the appropriate content of these reforms and how to
achieve them, especially within the political class. Mexicans differ
sharply in their faith in the market to generate and equitably distribute
wealth, and in their resulting belief in the need for state intervention to
promote positive policy outcomes. Yet they agree that the free market
should be the foundation of the Mexican economy even as they disagree
3
about how free that market should be.
Mexico's reform challenge is thus somewhat narrower than many other
Latin American countries, but this absolutely does not mean it will be
easier. The structure and operation of Mexican democracy since the 2000
election of the first opposition president after seventy-one years of one3. Clear evidence of this fact is found in two surveys of mass and political elite opinion taken during 2006. They demonstrated, for example, that Mexican voters of all
political stripes favored expanding trade relations with the United States, and
Mexican politicians of both the left and the right also strongly favored this (even as
they disagreed sharply about how to obtain this outcome, and especially about the
details of NAFTA). These surveys also showed that even the leftist Democratic
Revolutionary Party-its leaders and its voters-is "centrist" in the question of
who should be responsible for citizens' social welfare, the government or the individual. Kathleen Bruhn & Kenneth F. Greene, Elite Polarization Meets Mass
Moderation in Mexico's 2006 Elections, 40 PS: POL. ScL & POL. 33, 33-38 (2007).
See also Joseph L. Klesner, The 2006 Mexican Elections: Manifestation of a Divided
Society?, 40 PS: POL. ScL. & POL. 27, 27-32 (2007).
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party rule have made compromise on critical economic reforms extremely
difficult. Mexico's ability to lower prices for a wide range of services and
products by promoting increased competition (especially in the telecommunications sector), to undertake a labor reform that affords firms more
flexibility in hiring and firing while protecting worker rights and that increases union accountability and democracy, to invest heavily in the
country's huge backlog of needed infrastructure developments and
human capital investments, and to undertake a far-reaching reform of the
national petroleum company (Pemex) is consequently in question. This
reform agenda was left virtually untouched from 2001 to 2006 and now
seems apt to experience only limited and incremental policy advances in
the years ahead.
This paper analyzes the political setting in democratic Mexico which
explains the country's limited capacity to make progress on its pending
reform agenda. It will illuminate how the structure of Mexico's transitional democracy, the character of its three main political parties, and
legacies from the country's authoritarian past constrain the range of political maneuverability of any national government. It then looks at how
these factors operate in Mexico's current policy context, giving particular
attention to the first eighteen months of the Administration of President
Felipe Calderon, and explains why they raise serious concerns about the
Mexican government's ability to implement the policy reforms needed to
ensure stable growth based on increased integration and competitiveness
in the coming years.
II.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF DEMOCRATIC MEXICO
A.

STILL A TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY

The 2000 election of Vicente Fox, Mexico's first opposition president,
marked a significant milestone in the country's incremental transition toward democracy. Beginning with electoral reforms during the 1960s and
1970s, Mexico initiated a slow-motion transition to electoral democracy
driven by the remarkably successful efforts of Mexico's long-standing authoritarian political regime to adjust its institutional structure in order to
sustain its political legitimacy. 4 Additional reforms during the 1980s were
designed to blunt the advance of opposition forces during a deep economic crisis, and were thus somewhat more significant. These reforms
4. For discussion of the history of Mexico's transition to democracy, see DILEMMAS
OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO (Kevin J.Middlebrook ed., 2004); DANIEL C.
LEVY & KATHLEEN BRUHN, MEXICO: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVEL-

OPMENT (2006); RODERIC Al CAMP, POLITICS IN MEXICO: THE DEMOCRATIC CON-

SOLIDATION (5th ed. 2007). The slow-motion character of this transition is the
subject of Jose Antonio Crespo, Party Competition in Mexico: Evolution and Prospects, in DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 57-81 (Kevin J. Mid-

dlebrook ed., 2004). For strong theoretical explanations of the factors driving the
transition, see TODD A. EISENSTADT, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: PARTY
STRATEGIES AND ELECTORAL INSTITUTIONS, chapters 6-7 (2004); BEATRIZ
MAGALONI, VOTING FOR AUTOCRACY:

DEMISE IN MEXICO (2006).

HEGEMONIC PARTY SURVIVAL AND ITS
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made possible the election of the country's first opposition governor and
opened the door for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to
lose its historic dominance in the national legislature. Forced to negotiate
with the opposition, Presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-94) and Ernesto
Zedillo (1994-2000) made further electoral concessions designed to gain
congressional approval for high-priority economic reforms. These political reforms ultimately produced an independent election authority, the
Federal Election Institute (WE), and an independent electoral supreme
court, which made possible the election of an opposition majority in the
lower house of Congress in 1997, followed by an opposition president in
2000. This slow-motion, controlled process meant that the Mexican transition was largely orderly and peaceful. But the fact that these electoral
reforms were designed to perpetuate an authoritarian system rather than
promote democracy also ensured that democratic Mexico would inherit
the core political institutions and attitudes from its authoritarian
5
predecessor.
The euphoria that surrounded Fox's seemingly improbable election victory belied the history of incremental change that had facilitated this outcome and obscured that fact that Mexico's transition was far from
complete. 6 In a mature democracy, the distribution of policy-making authority among the executive, legislature, and judiciary and between the
federal and state governments is well delineated and accepted by all actors in the political system. Electoral outcomes are accepted by the
losers, and negotiation and compromise are aided by a shared acceptance
of these democratic rules of politics. In a transitional democracy, these
democratic practices do not yet define the perception and behavior of
political actors. The precise distribution of power is less clear and often
in flux. Confidence in the impartiality of electoral authorities, and thus
the willingness of losers to accept their fate is not assured. Trust that
other political actors will respect the democratic rules of politics is thus
incomplete, and negotiation and compromise are difficult. The transitional qualities of Mexican democracy are based in and heavily colored
governance that preceded Mexby the particular form of authoritarian
7
ico's democratic transition.
The authoritarian powers of the Mexican presidents during the authoritarian era emanated not from strong constitutional powers, but instead
from the political monopoly of a hierarchical and disciplined party led by
5. Pamela K. Starr, Monetary Mismanagement and Inadvertent Democratization in
Technocratic Mexico, STUD. IN COMP. INT'L DEV., Winter 1999, at 35-6.

6. On the improbable nature of Vicente Fox's victory, see Chappell Lawson, Introduction, in MEXICO's PIVOTAL DEMOCRATIC ELECTION: CANDIDATES, VOTERS,
AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 2000 1-21 (Jorge I. Dominguez & Chappell
Lawson eds., 2004).
7. Luis Rubio, Democratic Politics in Mexico: New Complexities, in MExiCO UNDER

Fox, 5, 34 (Luis Rubio & Susan Kaufman Purcell eds., 2004) (clearly presenting
the origins, nature, and governing consequences of this gradual and incomplete
transition to democracy).
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the president.8 The constitutional authority of the Mexican presidency is
actually relatively limited. Mexico's federalist constitution weakens the
presidency by dividing legislative authority among the president, the national congress, and state governments. 9 While the president can veto
legislation, he lacks the exclusive power of many other Latin American
presidents to introduce legislation and is denied the ability to sidestep the
legislature by calling a referendum, a plebiscite, or ruling by decree. Further, a largely independent supreme court has begun to act as the arbiter
of the constitution's separation of powers in recent years and has thereby
created another obstacle to presidential power grabs.' 0 Each of Mexico's
two democratic presidents has lacked a congressional majority and has
thus been constrained by the constitution in ways not seen in Mexico for
three-quarters of a century. In democratic Mexico, the president must
negotiate and compromise with the federal legislature and state governors to advance his policy agenda.
The ability of Mexicans to adapt to and develop confidence in these
new rules of politics will inevitably take time. The culture of executive
dominance that permeated most of Mexican political history will continue
to color expectations and actions until new political experiences demonstrate that things have actually, tangibly changed. For Mexican federal
legislators and state governors, the fear that a clever president could figure out how to manipulate the levers of power and use them to restore
the traditional powers of the presidency was particularly acute in the immediate aftermath of Vicente Fox's electoral victory. Legislators and
governors jealously guarded their recently acquired policy-making influence and aggressively and effectively expanded their reach, often at the
expense of governability. 1 While these attempts to redefine the separation of powers in Mexico are less intense eight years later, the precise
constitutional division of powers still exhibits numerous gray areas. More
telling, politicians' behavior still exhibits only limited confidence in the
continuing capacity of the constitution to constrain presidential authority.
Presidential predominance in Mexican politics also meant that citizens
had few institutional means to voice their complaints and therefore developed a tradition of mass protest to express their opposition to government policies or actions. Taking to the streets to block highways, bridges,
tollbooths, and access to buildings and thereby pressuring the government to respond to citizen complaints is another authoritarian legacy that
8. Jeffrey Weldon, The PoliticalSources of Presidencialismo in Mexico, in PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, 225 (Scott Mainwaring & Mathew
Soberg Shugart eds., 1997); Maria Amparo Casar, Executive-Legislative Relations:

The Case of Mexico (1946-1997), in

LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA,

114, 144 (Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif eds., 2002).
9. Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.] (Mex.).
10. Jodi Finkel, Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules after Mexico's 1994 Judicial Reform: An Empowered Court, 35 J. of Lat. Am. Stud. 777 (2003).
11. Rubio, supra note 7; Pamela K Starr, Political-InstitutionalAnalysis of Social Policy in Mexico (2000-2006) and its Future Prospects, Soc. PROGRAMS DIVISION OF
THE INTER-AM. DEV. BANK

(2006).
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lives on in democratic Mexico. Vicente Fox's presidency faced repeated
street protests and occasional violent disputes despite the supposed increase in citizens' access to politicians' ears that should accompany democratization. 12 Equally, electoral outcomes (especially from the mid1980s to the mid-1990s) were often "revised" by the Mexican president
following mass demonstrations protesting alleged electoral fraud. The
survival of this cultural holdover from Mexico's authoritarian past was all
too evident in the decision of the candidate who lost the 2006 presidential
13
election by a razor-thin margin to challenge the results in the streets.
B.

STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES TO BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE MAJORITY

A weak presidency operating in a political culture still afflicted by
strong authoritarian inheritances and unable to quickly establish new patterns of political interaction and policy-making has made governing democratic Mexico inevitably challenging. This difficulty, however, has been
magnified by Mexico's structurally divided legislature. Studies of presidential democracies have shown effective governance depends heavily on
14
the president's ability to form and manage a congressional majority.
Yet the characteristics of Mexican society, the configuration of the country's electoral laws, and the nature of its political parties have made this a
very difficult task.
Election outcomes and polling undertaken in conjunction with recent
Mexican elections reflect multiple, deep-seeded, and over-lapping divisions in Mexican society. 15 The country's evident socioeconomic divide,
however, has not proven to be one of the key determinants of voting
behavior. In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, it was assumed that an electorate no longer defined by its support for or opposition to the old authoritarian regime would experience a realignment
reflecting the population's evident socioeconomic differences. Yet despite the populist rhetoric permeating the 2006 election, especially the
presidential campaign, there is no indication that traditional socioeconomic indicators such as income, education level, and skin color are driv12. Rubio, supra note 7.
13. Todd A. Eisenstadt, The Origins and Rationality of the "Legal versus Legitimate"
Dichotomy Invoked in Mexico's 2006 Post-ElectoralConflict, 40 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 39, 41-42 (2007).
14. PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 394-439 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1997); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK, THE POLITICS OF POLICIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA, 2006 REPORT (2005).
15.

ALEJANDRO MORENO,

EL VOTANTE

MEXICANO:

DEMOCRACIA,

ACTITUDES

POLITICAS Y CONDUCTA ELECTORAL (2003); Alejandro Moreno, Ideologias, Estilos de Vida y Votos, FOREIGN APr. EN EsPAfqOL, Apr.-June 2006; Alejandro
Moreno, The 2006 Mexican Presidential Election: The Economy, Oil Revenues,
and Ideology, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 15 (2007) [hereinafter Moreno, Mexican
PresidentialElection]; Joseph L. Klesner, The 2006 Mexican Election and Its Aftermath, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 11 (2007).
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ing electoral decisions. 16 Mexicans' voting behavior instead reflects their
partisan loyalties and identities (including what they perceive to be the
appropriate development strategies and the role of the state in the economy), and the region in which they live. As one analyst of Mexican political parties described it, party identification in Mexico "is an affinity...
created in childhood [and which] lasts throughout a person's lifetime"
regardless of campaigns, candidates, and economic circumstances. 17 In
the 2006 presidential election, 90.3 percent of self-identified supporters of
the National Action Party (PAN) voted for the PAN candidate for the
presidency, 93.5 percent of members of the Democratic Revolutionary
Party (PRD) did the same, as did 72.5 percent of the former ruling party,
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and these three parties accounted for about 70 percent of the presidential vote and 90 percent of
18
the legislative vote.
These wide-spread partisan biases in Mexican's voting behavior would
not necessarily hinder the formation of a majority block in the Mexican
Congress. But the nature of their overlap with Mexico's regional divide,
which is reinforced through electoral law, leads to a distribution of the
vote that strongly favors a three-way division of legislative seats among
these three dominant political parties. The PAN, representing the centerright of the political spectrum, for example, dominates Mexico's centerwest region and is competitive in the north and in a single southeastern
state, Yucatan. The PRD, representing the center-left in Mexican politics, dominates Mexico City and Michoacan and is competitive in the several key southern states. The former ruling party, the PRI, meanwhile, is
competitive throughout most of the country even though its strongest
base of support is in the south. 19 This geographic distribution of partisan
loyalties makes it much easier for each of these three parties to win significant representation in the national legislature. Electoral laws, meanwhile, also make it very difficult for any single party to win a majority of
legislative seats.
Three-quarters of the Mexican senate and the entire chamber of deputies are elected in regionally-based election districts, giving all three parties the opportunity to translate their regional bases of strong partisan
support into a significant number of seats in the national legislature. This
three party split is reinforced in the Mexican senate by an election rule
that guarantees representation to the second largest party in the state
(the rule reserves one of each state's three senatorial seats for the leading
16. Bruhn & Greene, supra note 3, at 33-38; Klesner, supra note 3, at 27-32; Moreno,
Mexican PresidentialElection, supra note 15.
17. Joy Langston, Strong Parties in a Struggling Party System; Mexico in the Democratic Era, in PARTY POLITICS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 243, 251 (Paul Webb & Stephen White eds., 2007).
18. Klesner, supra note 3, at 31.
19. Joseph L. Klesner, The Structure of the Mexican Electorate: Social, Attitudinal, and
PartisanBases of Vicente Fox's Victory, in MExico's PIVOTAL DEMOCRATIC ELECVOTERS, AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 2000 91
(Jorge I. Dominguez & Chappell Lawson eds., 2004); Klesner, supra note 3.

TION: CANDIDATES,
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candidate from the party receiving the second largest number of votes).
In the Chamber of Deputies, small election districts based on majority
rules produces a similar outcome (parties can translate local strength into
legislative seats even if they are only the second or third largest party in
the state). Congressional elections also include proportional representation seats that are distributed according to each party's total vote count,
but in the Chamber of Deputies, these elections take place in five regionally defined districts. Finally, a new campaign financing law approved in
late 2007 heavily favors Mexico's larger parties in the distribution of campaign finances and media time. Given the nature of Mexico's partisan and
regional divides, these electoral regulations favor a three-way distribution
of legislative seats among the country's three largest political parties and
thereby hinder the ability of any single party to win a congressional majority. It is not surprising then that no party has held a majority in the
Chamber of Deputies since 1997 or in the Senate since 2000.20
This division of legislative power suggests the possibility of creating a
legislative majority by forming an alliance between two of these three
leading parties, and that is indeed how most legislation has been approved in Mexico since the 1997 disappearance of a single party majority
in the federal legislature. Creating a stable legislative alliance, however,
has been hindered by the strong programmatic differences and personal
disputes that separate Mexico's three main political parties.
The PRD and the PAN sit at opposite ends of the economic policy
spectrum, with the PRD favoring more statist policies and the PAN backing a more market-based approach. Indeed, a recent study demonstrates
that the representatives of these two parties in the chamber of deputies
hold policy positions that are more polarized than their respective electoral base and are among the most polarized in the country. 2 1 In addition,
the personal mistrust and enmity among these politicians is striking. The
personal origins and political experiences of the politicians who populate
these two parties are also strikingly different. Their consequently distinct
political histories and personal experiences have created very few "cultural reference points" to promote an ease of interaction that helps build
the confidence and trust that is an essential prerequisite for effective policy cooperation and alliance formation. 22 This basic foundation of mistrust between the PRD and the PAN exploded in the aftermath of the
disputed 2006 presidential election, leaving many legislators from both
parties unwilling even to speak with their colleagues from the other
20. On the impact of electoral rules on the composition of legislatures, see

MARK

JONES, ELECTORAL LAWS AND THE SURVIVAL OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES

(1995); Scott Mainwaring & Timothy R. Scully, Introduction, in BUILDING DEMOPARTY SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA 1-34 (Scott Mainwar-

CRATIC INSTITUTIONS:

ing & Timothy R. Scully eds., 1995); J.

MARK PAYNE ET AL., DEMOCRACIES IN

DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA
CAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,

(2007);

INTER-AMERI-

supra note 14.

21. Bruhn & Greene, supra note 3.
22. Chappell Lawson, How Did We Get Here? Mexican Democracy after the 2006 Elections, 40 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 45 (2007); Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
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party.2 3

The leadership of the PRI led the charge for market reform during the
1980s and 1990s suggesting that a stable legislative alliance with the PAN
should be programmatically feasible. In fact, a PRI-PAN alliance was the
key to legislative approval of most of Mexico's market reforms during the
1990s. In the aftermath of the PRI's 2000 electoral defeat, however, this
alliance faced a rebellion from the more traditionalist wing of the PRI.
These left-leaning PRI politicians always doubted the wisdom of market
reform, used their power to block key energy and labor reforms prior to
2000, and now argued that the PRI-PAN "alliance of convenience" was
responsible for the party's electoral losses in 2000. The PRI's ability to
form a working alliance with the PRD, meanwhile, has been seriously
hampered by the personal enmity many PRI partisans feel toward PRD
"turncoats" (the PRD was formed when a large group of PRI politicians
defected from the party and joined forces with leftist opponents of the
old regime). This enmity is shared by the PRD, many of whose members
were targets of government repression during the Salinas Administration.
The very fact that the PRI is an ideologically divided party suggests
another potential path toward construction of a stable legislative majority-breaking off a few PRI votes to join with the President's party on
key legislative votes. The effectiveness of this legislative strategy, however, is seriously complicated by the high rate of party unity and electoral
24
discipline evident in the legislative votes of Mexican political parties.
Despite the clear and often sharp divisions within these three parties,
their legislative contingents very rarely divide their votes. This unity is a
manifestation of Mexico's constitutional prohibition against reelection,
party control over candidate selection and campaign financing, and the
importance of party affiliations in Mexico. Unable to stand for reelection, Mexican legislators cannot appeal to their constituents to guarantee
their political survival. Politicians must instead rely on their party leaders-who control both candidate selection for most elective offices and
the distribution of public election funds-to obtain future political opportunities. Nor can a politician easily bolt a party to vote his or her conscience since Mexican law prohibits independent candidacies and the
leader of the party caucus controls the money needed to finance each
legislator's operational budget. The previously noted strong partisan loyalties of large voting blocs also make party labels a powerful tool for generating votes. These realities create a powerful incentive for party
members to heed their leaders' calls for a unified legislative vote.

23. Confidential interview (2008).
24. Jeffrey Weldon, Factores Institucionalesy Politicosde la Disciplina Partidariaen la
Cdmara de Diputados de M~xico, 1998-2002 (Mar. 2005) http://usmex.ucsd.edu/
research/conftpdfs/weldon.pdf; Benito Nacif, UnderstandingParty Discipline in the
Mexican Chamber of Deputies, in LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 25484 (Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif eds., 2002).
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C.

TEMPORAL COALITION-BUILDING

CHALLENGES

This litany of structural impediments to building a majority in the Mexican national legislature, while essential to understanding democratic
Mexico's long-term governing challenges, cannot fully explain the inability of the Fox Administration (2000-2006) to implement any of Mexico's
pending economic reform agendas or the only limited likelihood of farreaching reform under the leadership of Felipe Calderon (2006-2012). A
series of temporal obstacles to effective governance, themselves a direct
reflection the incomplete status of Mexico's democratic transition, have
further complicated executive-legislative relations since 2000.
Vicente Fox took office in late 2000 lacking a legislative majority (his
party won only 41 percent of congressional seats), but he enjoyed an unusually strong mandate as Mexico's first opposition president. But the
political shockwave associated with his unexpected victory led to disorder
in the President's party (PAN), disarray in the former ruling party, and
strategic errors by the administration that undercut further the President's ability to translate his strikingly high approval ratings into an effective legislative coalition.
The PAN was hesitant to fully back its president out of a fear that Vicente Fox would turn it into the new PRI-a party that existed only to
rubber stamp presidential initiatives. 25 In part this reflected the country's
complete lack of experience with a democratic model of executive-legislative relations between a ruling party and its president. But it also reflected a lack of confidence among PAN legislators regarding the kind of
governing relationship President Fox intended to have with them. While
most PAN legislators represented the old-line, more institutional wing of
the party, Fox hailed from a segment of the party that embodied newer,
less traditional members with backgrounds mostly in the private sector
and religious organizations. 26 These newer party members operated
largely independent of traditional party structures, created a parallel
campaign structure, and financed and ran Fox's presidential campaign
that effectively imposed its candidate on the party, thereby creating feelings of suspicion and mistrust in traditional party circles. This was reinforced by Fox's characterization of the party during the campaign as a
"straightjacket" and his stated preference for governing by going directly
"to the people." In the words of one of Mexico's preeminent PAN scholars, Fox's preference for "populist leadership evoked more the sort of
presidentialist voluntarism that had characterized PRI presidents than
the arrival of an entirely new political era."'2 7 The resulting mistrust between the PAN and its president led PAN legislators to oppose openly
25.

Interview with Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, PAN president (2003).

26. DAVID A. SHIRK, MEXICO'S NEW POLITICS (2005); Soledad Loeza, The National

Action Party (PAN): From the Fringes of the Political System to the Heart of
Change, in CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: ELECTORAL COMPETITON AND REGIME CONFLICTS 196-246 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy Scully eds.,

2003).
27. Loeza supra note 26, at 241.
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several of Fox's early legislative initiatives and prevented the party from
adjusting to its role as the party of government until the end of Fox's
presidency.
Despite having lost the presidency, the PRI won the largest number of
congressional seats in the 2000 election. This legislative might, combined
with a policy stance much closer to the administration position than the
left-leaning PRD, made the PRI an indispensable member of any legislative majority backing presidential initiatives. But the PRI was unable to
fulfill this role. As a party that was uniquely adapted to its role as the
party of state, the loss of the presidency upended the PRI's historic traditions of hierarchy, unity, and discipline, and left the party leaderless and
rudderless. Without presidential leadership, three distinct power centers
emerged within the party, each leading their faction of the PRI in slightly
different policy directions and each determined to take full control of the
party. None of these leaders were able to speak for the entire party and
they were willing to sacrifice governance in their struggle to win control
of the PRI. Time and again, PRI leaders were either unable or unwilling
to fulfill their promises to the President and deliver the party's legislative
vote, leaving President Fox without a credible interlocutor in the PRI for
much of his presidency.
The administration compounded these difficulties through strategic
missteps that further undermined its coalition-building efforts. 28 First, a
lack of policy coordination in the administration sent mixed messages to
the opposition. Just as the Fox team was never quite sure with whom it
should work in the PRI, PRI leaders were equally unsure about which of
the multiple policy proposals emanating from within the cabinet was actually administration policy. Second, the Fox team stumbled badly in its
early efforts to build a legislative coalition, and in the process inadvertently reenergized the political opposition. Third, President Fox decided
to begin his government by tackling two of the most polarizing issues in
the country's economic reform agenda-fiscal and energy reform. Fox
believed he would enjoy an extended honeymoon as the man who ended
the seventy-one-year reign of the PRI and that he could take advantage
of this position to force these highly contentious issues through the legislature. Instead, the polarizing debates surrounding fiscal and energy reform poisoned the political climate and severely damaged the collegial
relations among legislators needed to build majorities in a divided congress. Although the Fox administration was ultimately able to pass several important pieces of legislation-most notably, a transparency law, a
new social development law, and a new budget law-these successes were
few and far between and did not include any core economic reforms.
The temporal situation facing Felipe Calderon at the time of his December 2006 inauguration was both better and worse than what Vicente
Fox confronted. Despite facing the same structural obstacles to effective
28. Pamela K. Starr, Fox's Mexico: Same as It Ever Was?, CURRENT
58-65.
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governance that hindered policy-making during the Fox administration,
Felipe Calderon inherited a democracy with six additional years of operational experience. As a result, the rules of the political game were somewhat clearer, the PRI was more unified and cooperative, the PAN seemed
chastised by its past mistakes, and Calderon was afforded the opportunity
to learn from his predecessor's mistakes. Yet President Calderon also
took office following a highly contested election whose outcome was so
controversial that it briefly threatened to destabilize Mexican democracy.
The election produced doubts about the legitimacy of Calderon's victory,
created a strong and decided opposition, and left the consequent impression that Calderon was likely to be a very weak president. A sharp split
between Calderon and the president of the PAN did little to alleviate this
concern. Calderon further inherited an economy whose global competitiveness was in evident decline and a petroleum company whose difficulties had compounded during the previous six years.
III.

29
THE CURRENT POLICY STALEMATE

A.

CALDERON'S CHALLENGE

President Calderon took office with limited political capital in a challenging environment. He won just 36 percent of the votes cast in the July
2, 2006, presidential contest and defeated his closest challenger, Andres
Manuel Lopez Obrador of the PRD, by just 0.6 percent of the total. This
narrow margin of victory and President Vicente Fox's decision to skirt the
legal limits of presidential participation in the election campaign convinced a suspicious left that it had been cheated of its legitimate victory.
Following weeks of street protests and an unsuccessful challenge of the
results in court, the PRD and several small left-leaning parties remained
defiant and determined to block Calderon's policy agenda as both wrong
and "illegitimate." Lopez Obrador took advantage of the 25 percent of
the Mexican electorate which continued to see Calderon's victory as
fraudulent to inaugurate himself the "legitimate" president of Mexico on
November 20. He forbade his supporters to interact with representatives
of the new government, and encouraged his legislative allies as they occupied the Chamber of Deputies and nearly prevented Calderon from taking the oath of office.
Unsurprisingly, Calderon took office without a legislative majority.
The PAN positioned itself as the largest party in both houses of the Mexican Congress, but once again with only 41 percent of the seats. Unlikely
to be able to negotiate with the left opposition alliance that controlled
29. This section draws heavily on research undertaken by the author in 2006 and 2007
when she worked as a political risk analyst at the Eurasia Group. It is based on
confidential interviews with politicians and policymakers, on the record interviews
with journalists, academics, and other practitioners, and an almost daily review of
the news media. The latter relied primarily on three Mexico City newspapers
(Reforma, Milenio, and El Universal), and secondarily on a wide range of
magazines and several additional newspapers.
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nearly a third of the legislature, Calderon was forced to rely on the politically opportunistic PRI. Calderon also had to deal with divisions and
jealousies in his own political coalition. The president of the PAN and its
leaders in both houses of the legislature represented a wing of the party
loyal to former President Fox. Calderon's relationship with this segment
of the PAN had never been great and it was damaged severely by his
having defeated Fox's preferred successor in a heated primary election
campaign. Calderon had a particularly poor personal relationship with
PAN president Manuel Espino, leading Calderon supporters to leak their
determination to arrange a "leadership coup" in the party. Beyond the
PAN, business leaders and the head of the teachers' union believed that
their support was what put Calderon over the top (not a difficult claim to
make when the margin of difference was just 0.6 percent of the votes
cast), and thus expected the new president to express his gratitude with
positions in the government, favorable legislation, and the like.
B.

CALDERON'S SURPRISING EARLY SUCCESSES

A trained politician, well aware of the tight constraints on his room for
policy action, and having gleaned clear lessons from the mistakes of his
predecessor, Felipe Calderon developed his initial governing strategy
with the help of a tightly knit circle of policy advisers. The strategy was
realistic and pragmatic, and hence limited in scope. It focused on advancing a small number of reforms, beginning with the least controversial,
responding to central PRD concerns, and completely avoiding matters
that were likely to create considerable conflict. The government's objective was to achieve a few policy successes to erase the perception that
Calderon would be a weak president, increase popular support for the
government, make the deals necessary to solidify a good working relationship with the PRI in the Congress, and avoid any action that might
reinforce the post-election unity of Mexico's historically divided left. Ideally, it would also undermine support for Lopez Obrador in the PRD and
its allies, strengthen the more moderate factions of the party, and thereby
create the conditions for future negotiations with PRD legislators. But
this had to be done without alienating the small coterie of powerful business leaders who were capable of causing problems for any administration, but particularly for one they backed grudgingly and believed owed
victory to them.
The strategy initially focused on issues where the constitutional authority of the President was broad and the role of the legislature limited, such
as security and foreign policy, to send a clear and quick message that
Calderon was both a strong president and fully in charge. The President's
legislative agenda, meanwhile, aimed to move the country forward in the
only way he deemed possible in the wake of the 2006 presidential election-one small step at a time. It also focused on issues that would enable Calderon to build the alliances and the political capital needed to
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tackle more controversial issues-such as fiscal, energy, and labor reform-later on.
Implementing this strategy effectively would require near perfect political pitch, no major missteps, and a bit of good luck. President Calderon
benefited from all three during most of his first year in office. After aggressively (and believably) lowering expectations of what he would be
able to achieve, he moved quickly to establish his credentials as a decisive
and capable leader. During his first three weeks in office, he ended a
violent political conflict that had festered for six months in the southern
state of Oaxaca, launched what has become his signature military/police
offensive against the drug cartels, and quickly passed the 2007 budget on
a nearly unanimous vote by enticing (in effect buying) opposition support
by including several key PRD budget priorities and increasing federal
transfers to state governments, governed in their majority by the opposition. By the February 1, 2007, start of the spring congressional session,
Calderon had firmly established himself as the legitimate president of
Mexico in the eyes of the vast majority of the populace, as a probable
legislative ally of the PRI, and as a potentially honest broker in the eyes
of PRD legislators.
Calderon's first legislative victory, the March approval of a reform of
the state-workers' pension system, arose from the near perfect application of the government's legislative strategy. The Calderon team chose to
initiate their legislative efforts with pension reform for four reasons.
First, it was relatively easy. It did not involve the myriad of interests that
surround fiscal reform, was not a highly emotional issue like energy reform, and it did not threaten the interests of powerful political actors like
a labor or telecommunications reform. Second, it was largely non-controversial. Not only did it involve a pension system few Mexicans had heard
of (ISSSTE), after three years of negotiations during the Fox Administration, a consensus had formed between the government and the unions
regarding the core elements of the reform. Third, it solidified PRI confidence in Calderon as an honest broker. The administration made last
minute concessions to the PRI and its affiliated unions to win approval of
the reform, even though these changes reduced the economic efficiency
of the reform. And fourth, it pleased domestic business leaders and international markets. As the first economic reform approved in Mexico in
over six years, it created the impression that the reform logjam had finally
been broken and that more was likely to come.
The administration's strategy for moving this proposal through the legislature left the PRD completely flat-footed. Knowing that Lopez
Obrador and his allies were determined to block this legislation as illegitimate and anti-labor, the administration devised a strategy that deprived
the left of the time it needed to organize an effective opposition. The
government, the unions, and the PRI reached an agreement behind
closed doors prior to introducing the legislation in Congress. The PAN
also supported the measure, due in no small part to memories of the po-
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litical damage resulting from PAN legislators' refusal to back President
Fox's initial legislative initiative six years earlier. Based on this agreement, the bill flew through committee and onto the floor of the Chamber
of Deputies and then the Senate for approval. The whole process took
less than two weeks.
C.

FISCAL REFORM: THE PRICE OF SUCCESS

Calderon hoped to translate the momentum created by this surprising
success into rapid approval of a much more challenging piece of legislation-fiscal reform. To achieve this he needed to transform the goodwill
gained from the pension reform negotiations with the PRI into the trust
required to build a consensus on an issue capable of generating substantial political costs. Calderon needed to convince the moderate left that
there were greater gains than costs to be had from participating in the
fiscal reform negotiations. PRD participation would provide the PRI
with political cover from accusations that it had become the legislative
puppet of the President. Of equal important, any attempt to do another
end-run around the PRD on such a pivotal legislative issue would likely
have driven enraged PRD legislators back into the arms of Lopez
Obrador. Calderon needed to guarantee the full support of the PAN for
any tax increase if he was to have any hope of convincing the opposition
to support it. The political balancing act required to win approval of fiscal reform was significantly more complex than that required for pension
reform and thus a tougher test of the scope of democratic governance.
The PRI leadership set Calderon's fiscal balancing act in motion during
the spring and summer of 2007. Calderon's erstwhile legislative allies
were concerned that the President might replicate traditional PRI practices and use the resources of the state to promote two PAN gubernatorial candidates in close races with PRI standard bearers. The PRI thus
took advantage of its strategic position in the legislature and demanded
that Calderon and his representatives cease their support for PAN gubernatorial candidates in exchange for continued PRI participation in the
fiscal reform negotiations. Given the pivotal importance of this piece of
legislation for the Calderon team, the President acquiesced and the PAN
lost control of Yucatan in the May 2007 election (although it retained
control of Baja California two months later).
Although Calderon was willing to pay this political price to consolidate
his legislative alliance with the PRI, the PAN leadership was appalled.
Bolstered by his enmity for Calderon, PAN President Espino blamed Calderon for the party's loss in Yucatan and openly worked to weaken his
influence in the party. In response, Calderon's associates reinforced efforts already underway to remove Espino from the party leadership, beginning with an overwhelming victory for Calderon supporters in an early
June party election and culminating five months later with the election of
a close Calderon confidant as the new president of the PAN. Calderon
now had full control of the PAN. But the tactics used to achieve a victory
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described by both sides as a virtual coup d'dtat left behind bruised feelings and deep resentments, and Calderon's concessions to the PRI led to
continuing concerns among party activists that the President was too willing to sacrifice party interests to maintain his legislative majority.
At the other end of the political spectrum, Calderon attempted to
loosen the ties between PRD moderates and Lopez Obrador by taking
actions he hoped would legitimize his poverty-fighting credentials and
demonstrate that he was not blindly pro-business, as the left charged.
Calderon publicly inaugurated hospitals, clinics, and schools, he spoke
passionately of the need to help the poor, and he promised to dedicate a
significant portion of any new government revenues to social policy. The
willingness of PRD moderates to participate in the legislative debate over
Calderon's policy proposals, however, had more to do with a bit of good
luck-a series of strategic mistakes by a politician who had previously
avoided them, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.
Lopez Obrador's obstinate refusal to recognize Felipe Calderon as the
President of Mexico undermined his popular support. His strategic decision to take his campaign to the people in the provinces in conjunction
with his antagonism toward the media led to his disappearance from the
national news for weeks at a time and the consequent impression that he
had faded from the political scene. And Lopez Obrador's decision to
demand that PRD legislators not participate in a legislative process
headed up by an "illegitimate" president angered and frustrated PRD
legislators. While PRD congressmen agreed that Calderon had won the
presidency illegitimately, most felt the best response was to use their
power in the legislature (they controlled nearly one-third of the seats) to
promote the left's long-standing policy objectives. PRD legislators knew
their freedom of action was limited by Lopez Obrador's tight control over
the party base and his consequent capacity to brand them as traitors and
effectively end their political careers should they veer too far to the
"right." But within these limits, the moderates who dominated the
PRD's legislative contingent were determined to do their jobs and address the traditional concerns of the left. Finally, Lopez Obrador's lack
of attention to internal party elections in July and August 2007 allowed
the moderates to win a decisive victory, giving the impression (albeit a
false one) that Lopez Obrador's power had declined significantly. This
sequence of developments left PRD moderates feeling empowered and
convinced that they would be able to negotiate, albeit carefully, on the
fiscal and electoral reforms working their way through the Congress.
Calderon took advantage of this window of opportunity to push forward his proposal for a fiscal reform. The proposal originally contained
an historic demand of the Finance Ministry to extend Mexico's valueadded-tax (VAT) to food and medicine. This was a highly controversial
proposal-the left was dead set against it and the PRI had identified it as
the reason for withdrawing its support for a fiscal reform proposal only a
few years earlier. But the Finance Ministry was wedded to the VAT as
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the only tax capable of raising significant new revenues. Although the
PRI leadership was willing to talk about this tax, considerable opposition
to it persisted in the party. Party members worried about the political
costs of supporting a measure widely seen as damaging to the interests of
the poor, especially given the PRD's strident and united opposition to
this tax and with a gubernatorial election on the horizon. After weeks of
political maneuvering, the PRI finally announced its opposition to any
expansion of the VAT. The administration was cornered. Without the
VAT, the reform would be marginal at best, but without the votes of the
PRI there would be no reform at all.
Breaking this stalemate came at a significant political cost to President
Calderon and his ability to form future legislative majorities on controversial economic issues. Through a bit of creative thinking, the Finance
Ministry filled the hole in the tax plan created by the opposition's rejection of a VAT on food and medicine. It created a new tax whose ultimate
effect was to eliminate virtually every loophole in the corporate tax code.
Not only was this tax estimated to raise a similar amount of revenue as
the VAT (and has in fact raised more than expected), it reinforced administration efforts to belie the perception that it was excessively pro-business, and guaranteed an influx of new revenues the administration could
spend on its priority projects.
This ingenious means of salvaging fiscal reform, however, damaged
Calderon's relationship with the private sector. Businessmen were blindsided by a new tax that would significantly increase their tax liabilities. In
conjunction with a threatened tightening of regulations in the telecommunications sector and a Calderon speech in the early fall chastising business
leaders for not leading the fight against poverty and inequality, the new
tax exhausted the business elite's patience. The apparent decline of Lopez Obrador's political fortunes, meanwhile, weakened Calderon's ability
to mitigate the consequences of their discontent by reminding them of
what economic horrors likely awaited them if his government were to fail.
Calderon did calm the concerns of key business leaders, but apparently at
the price of taking telecommunications reform off the government's
agenda for a time and promising that he would turn his legislative energies to issues of particular interest to business such as energy and labor
reform.
Equally costly to Calderon's ability to navigate the structural and temporal obstacles to effective governance in Mexico were the unintended
consequences of the process by which this tax bill cleared the legislature.
Although the PRI strongly supported the new fiscal reform proposal,
PRD legislators still opposed it strongly and PRI party leaders were hesitant to approve the measure without the cover on the left the PRD could
provide. In their effort to reposition the PRI as a center-left party willing
to cooperate to end the congressional gridlock of the past, party leaders
were concerned the PRI could be seen as too supportive of the government. Knowing that fiscal reform was Calderon's overriding legislative
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objective, having previously coerced Calderon into acquiescing to their
electoral demands, and knowing that Calderon desperately wanted the
measure approved by the end of August so the new taxes could be applied to the 2008 budget, the PRI took a calculated risk. In early August,
it backed the PRD's demand that electoral reform be taken up in conjunction with fiscal reform and it insisted that a third of all new revenues
be used to recapitalize the ailing national petroleum company (a core
PRI legislative aim). Calderon's negotiators cried foul but the PRI refused to budge. A flurry of activity ensued to finalize an already welladvanced electoral reform and to find additional revenue sources to replace the funds now earmarked for Pemex. After several very tense days
of final negotiations, the two reforms passed the legislature simultaneously in the first days of September.
Calderon's pragmatic decision to accede to the PRI's demands translated into a revised electoral law that pleased the PRD and a slightly
watered-down but still quite significant fiscal reform. It also helped foster a good relationship between the President and the now undisputed
legislative leader of the PRI, Senator Manlio Fabio Beltrones. But it also
had several troubling political consequences that narrowed rather than
expand President Calderon's room for political action. First, it firmly
positioned the PRI as the undisputed power broker in the Mexican Congress and emboldened Beltrones to use this power to obtain political and
economic concessions in exchange for his future support. Second, it left a
very bad taste in the mouths of elite businessmen making their demands
that the government quickly turn its legislative attention to energy and
labor issues difficult to ignore. Third, the apparent disappearance of Lopez Obrador from the national political scene throughout the spring and
summer reinforced the mistaken impression that his power and influence
were on the wane.
D.

PEMEX REFORM:

CALDERON LOSES PERFECT POLITICAL PITCH

Mexico's national petroleum company, Pemex, is one of the largest oil
companies in the world, sitting on what oilmen are convinced is a huge
supply of oil and gas, but it is also in very bad shape. Following years of
operating losses, by early 2008, the firm was saddled with a $105 billion
debt that nearly matched the value of its assets. Production began to fall
off rapidly starting in 2004, a drop in exports became evident by 2008, and
reserves imploded over the past decade, leaving Mexico with just nine
years of proven reserves. But Pemex clearly lacks the technology, experience, and the investment capital needed to quickly reverse its declining
rate of production and rebuild its reserves. The economic risk to Mexico
of a perpetuation of these ugly trends is no longer found on its balance of
trade (petroleum products account for only about 10 percent of total national exports), but in the country's fiscal accounts. The Mexican government relies on Pemex to finance between 35 and 40 percent of
government spending, creating a real risk of fiscal instability should pe-
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troleum production fall off precipitously or record-high global oil prices
fall significantly.
Fixing what ails Pemex and/or weaning government finances off its dependency on petroleum revenues will take many years even after the legislation needed to make this happen is in place. Precisely what legal
changes are needed, however, has been the focus of a heated debate in
Mexico for the better part of a quarter century. More market-oriented
Mexicans led by the PAN and much of the business community believe
private investment should be allowed in the firm, including the privatization of many of its assets. Currently, the constitution precludes private
actors from owning Mexican petroleum, and a panoply of laws sharply
limit the participation of private actors in the company's operations.
More statist Mexicans led by the PRD and the more nationalist wing of
the PRI oppose any change to the laws that limit private participation in
Pemex and instead favor using tax monies to recapitalize the company.
These individuals are convinced that Pemex's problems are the consequence of an explicit government decision to decapitalize the firm and
drive it to the brink of disaster to prove their argument that Pemex cannot operate efficiently without significant private investment. Further,
the Mexican left firmly believes that the government's real objective is to
use legal reform, even a limited one, as a wedge to enable increased future private investment leading to the eventual privatization of large portions of the firm. While opinion polls repeatedly show that most
Mexicans have a more moderate view-they oppose the privatization of
Pemex strongly but are willing to allow some private investment in the
firm if this increased its efficiency as a state-owned company-this opinion has been lost in the polarized debate among Mexican politicians.
The controversial nature of Pemex reform complicated Calderon's effort to build a legislative majority to modify the laws governing Pemex's
operations (a constitutional reform had been ruled out months earlier).
To succeed in this effort, Calderon needed his good luck relative to Lopez
Obrador to continue and to perpetuate the near-perfect political pitch
that had buttressed his legislative successes in the spring and summer.
Unfortunately for Calderon, both luck and pitch abandoned him in late
2007 and early 2008.
Despite superficial evidence to the contrary, Andres Manuel Lopez
Obrador never disappeared from the national political scene. His travels
to the provinces to build his base of popular support kept him out of the
public eye and his political missteps emboldened his opposition within
the PRD. Events during the fall of 2007, however, gave him the opportunity to roar back onto the national political stage and remind his opponents of the power he continued to wield. A potential reform of Pemex
and Calderon's management of the issue fit Lopez Obrador's political
needs perfectly. The left's master politician wasted little time exploiting
this political opportunity to maximum effect.
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Throughout 2007, the PRI chairman of the Senate energy committee
led efforts to develop a bill that could win broad legislative support for a
tightly-controlled expansion of private investment in the firm. The foundation of this effort was an agreement not to modify Mexico's constitutional prohibition against private ownership of the country's petroleum
resources. Yet in early November PAN legislators leaked the contents of
a meeting between Calderon and PRI leaders in which the president proposed reviving the idea of a constitutional reform in an apparent effort to
pressure the PRI to accept broader private participation in the firm.
Whatever the reason for this leak, it did not sway the PRI but it did provide Lopez Obrador with ammunition to begin redefining the debate on
his terms-precisely what the Calderon administration had assiduously
avoided up to that point. Lopez Obrador immediately charged the government with planning the "privatization" of Pemex, labeling even the
most limited role for the private sector as "privatization". He thereby
deprived Calderon the power to set the terms of the debate and instead
forced his team to play defense. Rather than having the rhetorical space
to detail the benefits of any reform the President ultimately proposed, the
administration was now forced to focus its public relations campaign on
explaining why it would not amount to "privatization." With Lopez
Obrador setting the tone of the debate, PRD moderates were cornered.
Some had toyed with the idea of supporting limited private investment
outside of Pemex's core activities (exploration, production, and sales),
but the political consequences of supporting what was now clearly labeled
as a "privatization of Pemex" were suddenly much greater. Their plans to
take control of the party leadership in March elections were also thrown
in disarray as allies of Lopez Obrador actively exploited the popularity of
the Pemex issue to increase their appeal to party members. Finally, Lopez Obrador's discourse strengthened the position of nationalists within
the PRI. They began to speak out more loudly and aggressively against
the kind of reform favored by Calderon and made it politically much
more costly for the PRI legislative leadership to support the President's
initiative.
These developments meant that the developing compromise legislation
in the Senate was no longer a viable alternative. The Calderon team began to negotiate with PRI leaders behind closed doors on what they
hoped would be a limited yet still significant reform-a reflection of Calderon's trademark approach to governing democratic Mexico: do it "one
small step at a time." But these efforts were cut short by a bit of very bad
luck that further strengthened Lopez Obrador's hand. Lopez Obrador
received documents (rumored to have been leaked by Calderon adversaries in the PAN) detailing business agreements with Pemex signed by one
of Calderon's closest advisers-Juan Camilo Mourifio, Calderon's his
newly-minted interior minister and point man on the Pemex negotiations-while he worked in the energy ministry during the Fox administration. Although his actions were not illegal under Mexican law, they were
clearly unethical and raised serious questions about the motivations driv-
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ing the actions of Calderon's point man on Pemex reform. A stunningly
poor damage control operation, combined with Calder6n's refusal to dismiss his old friend, deepened the impact of the revelations.
This sequence of events made it even harder, if not impossible, for the
Calderon Administration to challenge effectively the PRD mantra:
Pemex reform = privatization. It also weakened the willingness of PRI
legislative leaders to stick their necks out to support Calderon. It hammered an additional nail in the coffin of any potential that might have
remained for PRD moderates to break ranks on Pemex reform, and it
reinforced Lopez Obrador's successful effort to position himself as the
savior of Pemex and to exploit this to restore his central role in national
politics and thereby advance his objective of winning Mexico's 2012 presidential election. Blocking the "privatization of Pemex" was always the
ideal issue around which to mobilize his supporters on the streets (social
movements, unions, and grass-roots PRD political organizers).
In this increasingly unfavorable political setting, Calderon announced a
very limited package of legal changes governing Pemex's operations in
April. It quickly became evident that this initiative had been negotiated
between the administration and the PRI prior to its presentation to the
Congress. The PRD cried foul, rightly fearing that the government once
again planned to rush this proposal through the Congress and sideline the
PRD from the debate. Lopez Obrador loudly demanded 120 days of debate on the issue and promised that his supporters would take to the
streets if the PRI-PAN majority were to approve this legislation. Under
pressure, the administration negotiated with the PRD to create a timeframe and structure for debate on the proposal. Just as an agreement for
a limited debate was about to be announced, PRD legislators preempted
it by occupying and effectively closing the Congress. Although the Congress reconvened in an alternate site to approve several non-controversial
pieces of legislation, prior to the constitutionally mandated April 30 end
of the spring legislative session, Pemex reform had been stopped cold.
The PRD only ended its occupation after the Calderon government
agreed to meet their core demand-a long, broad, and inclusive debate
on energy reform.
The public debate lasted well into the summer, delaying renewed legislative attention to the president's proposal until early fall. Efforts to find
a negotiated compromise faced Lopez Obrador's persistent threat of massive protests should legislators approve any expansion of private participation in the petroleum sector. In this context, Congress further scaled
back the president's April proposal and approved a bill that actually
tightened restrictions on private investment in the petroleum sector. To
an important extent, Calderon was able to snatch a limited political victory from the jaws of policy defeat. By embracing this reform, the President was able to sustain his legislative alliance with a PRI that had
become increasingly divided over the issue. More important, he was able
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to deprive Lopez Obrador of an issue with a uniquely powerful capacity
to unite the left and mobilize its supporters.
Nevertheless, Lopez Obrador's victory and Calderon's defeat on the
Pemex issue was striking, in part because of the reversal of fortunes it
represented for both politicians. Lopez Obrador and the PRD not only
prevented Calderon from achieving a limited reform during the spring
legislative session, the length of the debate and shifts in the political climate meant there would be no special session of Congress in the summer
to take up the issue. The PRD/Lopez Obrador victory also broke up the
PRI-PAN alliance with respect to energy reform. Throughout the spring
and early summer, the public statements of PRI leaders amounted to a
gradual backing away from Calderon's March proposal until they had
ruled out any change that would permit increased private investment in
Pemex. Maybe most important, the events of the spring had reunited the
PRD in its battle to prevent the "privatization of Pemex" and once again
placed Lopez Obrador at the center of the national political debate.
President Calderon's defeat was no less striking for being far less complete than Lopez Obrador's victory. His political operating room on the
Pemex question was inevitably narrow given the controversial character
of the issue and political consequences of his previous political successes.
But unlike his initial legislative efforts, this time Calderon encountered a
bit of bad luck and took two important missteps. By misreading the political lay of the land in the last months of 2007 (by seemingly underestimating the strength of his opposition and overestimating the capacity and
loyalty of his allies) he deeded to Lopez Obrador control of the policy
debate. By failing to anticipate the very real possibility that the PRD
might again resort to extra-institutional means to prevent becoming a repeat victim of a fast-track legislative strategy, this time on a highly controversial and emotional issue, Calderon saw the scope of possible energy
reform shrink markedly. And by aggressively out-maneuvering his adversaries to take full control of the PAN, Calderon and his team allowed
themselves to become the target of vengeful losers. None of these missteps were mammoth, nor was the blowback from previous successes necessarily devastating. But, in the limited room for political maneuvering
created by Mexico's structural and temporal obstacles to effective governance, they were enough to ravage Pemex reform.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLICY REFORM

By the end of 2007, Felipe Calderon had achieved a great deal under
very difficult political circumstances. Despite beginning under the weight
of an inauguration punctuated by fistfights and the perception that he was
apt to be cornered politically and stymied operationally throughout his
presidency, Calderon ushered through significant pension, fiscal, and
electoral reforms. In late 2007, he also won approval for a judicial reform
to support his effort to rein in organized crime. He did this by adopting a
pragmatic and realistic governing strategy that focused on the doable
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rather than the ideal and that accepted the need to make deals and concessions to move Mexico forward, even if only one or two steps at a time.
But the political consequences of these successes and Calderon's inability
to undermine Lopez Obrador's core base of support prevented the President from simultaneously building enough political capital to finance
more controversial reforms during 2008.
This does not mean that Mexico is risking political gridlock for the remainder of the Calderon presidency. There are a large number of secondary economic reforms and a bevy of political and social reforms that are
less contentious and thus more likely to be approved by the legislature in
the coming years. There is the question of how the July 2009 legislative
elections will affect the distribution of political forces. And there is Felipe Calderon, who continues to be a talented, pragmatic politician with
his political pitch intact. As 2007 demonstrated, a creative yet realistic
strategy, when effectively implemented, can produce surprising outcomes
that advance economic reform in Mexico little by little. Given the structural realities of Mexican politics and the contentious issues that dominate Mexico's economic reform agenda, however, there will be little
margin for policy missteps and bad luck. All this suggests that implementing the policies needed to enable Mexico to take full advantage of
the economic opportunities created by past market reforms and a bevy of
free trade treaties is not in Mexico's near-term future. But neither is a
collapse in governance, economic crisis, or a reversal of Mexico's current
reliance on free markets and open trading relations as core driver of economic growth and development.
V.
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